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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
OGDEN CITY, A Municipal Corporation,
Plaintiff,

vs.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH, a body politic and UTAH
POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a
corporation,

Case No.
7907

Defendants.

DEFENDANT PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 14, 1951, the City Commission of Ogden
City enacted an ordinance granting to Utah Power and
Light Co. (Defendent herein) "* * * the right, privilege or franchise * ~~< *" (R. 250) to operate an electric
utility business in Ogden City. This same ordinance levied
a charge upon the defendant company equal to 2% of its
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gross revenue derived from doing business within the
corporate limits of the city.
Prior to the enacting of this ordinance, the defendant
company paid to Ogden City a sum equal to % of 1% of
the company's gross revenue derived from operating within
the city limits plus certain free and reduced rate service
(R. 251-2).
All of the parties hereto have characterized this levy
as either a "license tax" or "franchise tax."
As pointed out in the plaintiff's brief, the P. S. C. U.
in its case No. 3780 after a hearing upon defendant company's application for a rate increase, heard in May and
June, 1952, ordered the company to collect this 2% levy
from "its customers in any municipality wherein is imposed any municipal franchise, occupation, sales or license
tax."
There is no substantial question of fact in this case.
This case is not concerned with the imposition of municipal
levies nor with the obligation or duty of the company to
discharge such levies. This case is directly and necessarily
concerned with the matter of the source of certain company
revenue, and the order of the commission here under revie~ undertakes to provide and prescribe the sources of
company revenue to pay the levy of Ogden City, and other
municipalities similarly enacting franchise or license taxes.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION IS WITHIN THE COMMISSION'S JURISDICTION, POWER AND AUTHORITY.
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POINT II.
THERE IS EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE MATERIAL FINDINGS OF SEC. 9, OF THE COMMISSION'S REPORT AND FINDINGS OF
FACT.
POINT III.
THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION DOES
NOT IMPAIR THE OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED
BY OGDEN CITY'S FRANCHISE ORDINANCE.
POINT IV.
THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION DOES
NOT ATTEMPT TO EXERCISE SUPERVISORY POWER OVER, NOR INTERFERE
WITH MUNICIPAL MONEY AND PROPERTY.
POINT V.
THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION DOES
NOT UNLAWFULLY ATTEMPT TO EXERCISE
POWER TO SUPERVISE AND INTERFERE
WITH MUNICIPAL MONEY AND PROPERTY;
NOR DOES IT CONSTITUTE AN EXERCISE
OF THE TAXING POWER.
ARGUMENT
There is apparently only one issue in this case and
that is whether or not just and reasonable practices require
that the company construct its rates so that, so far as
practicable, money to discharge municipal levies shall be
collected from its customers on a state-wide system basis.
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

POINT I.
THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION IS WITHIN THE COMMISSION'S JURISDICTION, POWER AND AUTHORITY.
Since. this same contention has been raised by Ogden
City in a similar case involving an order of the commission
to the same effect as the order herein attacked and an
appeal to this court (In re The Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co., I. & S. Docket No. 83, May 5, 1952, appeal case No.
7884) wherein the problem was thoroughly aired and
authorities cited; it is believed unnecessary to duplicate
the full review of authorities cited therein.
However, Section 54-4-1, and Section 54-4-4, U. C. A.
1953, gives the commission general jurisdiction over this
subject. Also, in the case of Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Public Service Commission, et al., 155 P. (2d) 184,
107 U. 502 (1945) the court said:
"The determination that rates charged are unjust, unreasonable, or confiscatory is not a judicial
function, but a legislative function to be exercised by
Public Service Commission as an arm of the legislature."
Certainly it cannot be successfully contended that the
statutes governing the Public Service Commission do not
plainly bring within its jurisdiction the type of problem
sought to be solved by the commission's order herein attacked.
The commission is under a statutory duty (Sec. 54-3-1,
U. C. A. 1953) to see that all charges made by a public
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utility "shall be just and reasonable"; and that is exactly what the commission has sought to do in its order.
It is to be noted that the so-called franchise ordinance
of Ogden City does not attempt to specify where the money
should come from with which the company is to pay the
sums required by its terms. It merely says that the company shall pay it. The company gets its money by establishing rates to be paid by its customers and the rates to
be charged by the company are under the control and within
the jurisdiction of the commission.
It must be concluded that the order of the commission
is within its jurisdiction, power and authority.
POINT II.
THERE IS EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE MATERIAL FINDINGS OF SEC. 9, OF THE COMMISSION'S REPORT AND FINDINGS OF
FACT.
Under this point it would seem advisable to point up
the well known distinction between evidentiary facts and
ultimate facts. An ultimate fact is in the nature of a conclusion based upon other facts which are called evidentiary
or primary facts. In this case we find the primary or evidentiary facts to be that the plaintiff (plus some 26 other
municipalities) have imposed franchise taxes upon the defendant company measured by the gross receipts of the
company from business within the municipality. The money
to pay for this levy is contributed by the company's customers in unincorporated areas and in municipalities which
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do not have such a tax, and, I suppose in municipalities
which have a similar tax to the extent that plaintiff's levy
exceeds the levy of that municipality. From these primary
or evidentiary facts are to be drawn the ultimate fact or
facts.
In this case the commission has drawn from the evidentiary facts set forth above the conclusion or ultimate
fact that the practice of the company in collecting this
franchise tax from all users systemwide is an unreasonable
and unjust rate practice by the company.
Under Section 54-3-8, U. C. A. 1953, the commission
is given the "power to determine any question of fact arising under this section," namely, when is there an unjust and
unreasonable discrimination between rate payers in different localfties?
The views of the Supreme Court of Washington in the
case of State v. Department of Public Service, 142 P (2d)
489, at page 535, refers to this same problem and uses the
following language:
"as stated above, the basis upon which excise taxes
have been levied by the cities vary greatly, ranging
from four per cent of the gross income to one per
cent. No one can say how far this variation might
be extended. It suggests large possibilities of municipal action. Manifestly there is an element of unjust discrimination in allowing one community to
levy and collect from respondent or any public utility engaged in business throughout the state an
occupation tax which in turn the utility would collect by a state-wide increase in rates."
In addition it should be kept in mind that prior to the
enactment of this franchise tax by Ogden City the company

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7

paid 3,4 of 1% ; then by the enactment of this ordinance the
payment was increased to 2% of the gross receipts. It does
not appear that this increased rate coincided with any increased use or privilege to the company. The company
merely continues to enjoy the rights and privileges which
it has for many, many years. Nor can the extension of
time satisfy the concept of consideration because certainly
Ogden City did not plan to do without an electric utility,
and it is supposed that should Ogden City desire to go into
the electric business it can still do so in spite of the franchise ordinance.
The conclusion must be made that the Ogden City
Ordinance is plainly a revenue raising tax from which it
may be properly concluded that it is manifestly "unjust and
unreasonable" to spread the cost of this tax system wide.
POINT III.
THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION DOES
NOT IMPAIR THE OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED
BY OGDEN CITY'S FRANCHISE ORDINANCE.
It is to be observed at the outset that the ordinance of
Ogden City does not attempt to specify any particular.
source of the money to pay the charge levied upon the company. The ordinance does not require the company not
to impose this franchise tax upon the Company's customers in Ogden City.
It would almost appear that Ogden City believed that

the company has an independent source of income separate and apart from the users of the electric utility. It would
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also appear that Ogden City is claiming a constitutional
right to tax residents of other municipalities, in that it
claims that its own citizens should be free from the tax
levied upon the company.
However, as poi~ted out in the telephone case, we are
.concerned in this case with the one issue, namely, what shall
be the source of the revenue to the company by which this
franchise tax shall be paid? It is considered useless to engage ourselves in the circular argument that the citizens
of Ogden are the real parties in interest and therefore are
being deprived of the benefit of their "contract"; because
the users of the utility are, by the same reasoning, the real
parties in interest on the other side, and therefore many
of the same people are both the obligors and obligees to this
"contract". Thus we arrive at a patently untenable position because you cannot be both free and bound at the
same time.
Thus for the sake of sensibility we must return to the
analysis that all we are concerned with here is the problem
of public utility rates and revenue.
Reference should be made to point III, in the Brief
of Defendant, case No. 7884 which is now before this court
where this question as raised by plaintiff is thoroughly
discussed; and inasmuch as this case is in principle a companion case to that one it is persuasive authority on this
question.
When the alleged "contract" does not specify the source
of the money with which the company is to pay the levy, how
can it possibly be said that the order of the Commission
impairs the obligations of that franchise? -
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POINT IV.
THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION DOES
NOT ATTEMPT TO EXERCISE SUPERVISORY POWER OVER, NOR INTERFERE
WITH MUNICIPAL MONEY AND PROPERTY.
Before the order in question was issued, the Company
was obligated to pay the City certain. taxes and to render
certain services. This duty remains completely unimpaired;
the City will receive precisely the same money and service,
at the same time, at the same rate, and from the same taxpayer as before. The Commission has the undisputed power
to regulate and control the rate relationship between the
Company and its customers whether these customers live '
in Ogden City or elsewhere. The Commission's order affects only the relationship between the Company and its
customers, and nothing more.
POINT V.
THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION DOES
NOT UNLAWFULLY ATTEMPT TO EXERCISE
POWER TO SUPERVISE AND INTERFERE
WITH MUNICIPAL MONEY AND PROP:h:RTY;
NOR DOES IT CONSTITUTE AN EXERCISE
OF THE TAXING POWER.
Plaintiff's Point VI, VII and VIII will be discussed
under this Point.
Again at the outset it must be pointed out that the
franchise ordinance does not attempt to prescribe the
source of the money to pay the 2% levy. Neither does the
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order of the Commission herein name Ogden City as a
party to whom this order has been issued. How can it be
said that the Commission has attempted to interfere with
the municipal money and property when the only order
issued by the Commission is directed to the Utah Power and
Light Company which clearly comes within the scope of
the Commission's regulatory power and authority?
Again it must be observed that Ogden City supposes
that the Company has some source of income other than its
customers. Any rate order of the commission is for the
purpose of transferring the obligations of the Company to
its customers because to do otherwise would expose the
Company to an unconstitutional confiscation of its property.
The city of Ogden is in the odd position of claiming the
power (and right) to levy a tax which, of necessity, the
major part of which is to be paid by persons outside of its
territorial jurisdiction. It would appear that we have here
a thinly veiled purpose, on the part of Ogden City, to extend the source of its tax revenues to include those living
in the rest of the State.
If weight is to be given to Ogden City's argument under

Point VI of its brief, then it would be necessary to hold that
none of the money to pay this 2% levy could, under our
constitution, be apportioned to residents of Ogden City,
but would have to be obtained from electric users outside
of Ogden City. To announce the proposition is to confirm
its absurdity.
It would appear that when plaintiff cites and quotes
from State vs. Dept. of Public Service, 142 P. 498, 535, in
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its points VII and VIII, a sufficient answer is given to the
arguments advanced by Ogden City thereunder. Does it
make a serious difference, if indeed the Commission's order
creates a difference, whether the levy of the city is passed
on to the Company's customers as a separate item or as
"special exchange rates * * * which will in effect require the rate payers in each community to absorb a sum
equal to the amount of the tax?" In this phase of the problem it would appear that we are faced with a distinction
without a difference. Certainly it does not change the substantive effect of "passing on" the levy by merely changing the method of billing. What Ogden City really means is
that its residents should not be required to pay this 2%
levy no matter what it is called.

CONCLUSION
The issues raised in this case are substantially the same
as, and will be controlled by the decision of the court in,
case No. 7884 now being considered by this court, and the
court's attention is drawn to that case.
Our conclusion is the same as our beginning, namely,
that this case is directly and necessarily concerned with
the source of certain company revenue with which to pay
municipal levies in the nature of franchise or license taxes.
It is necessarily concluded that "just and reasonable" practices do not require that these revenues come from a system
wide source, and it was proper for the commission to conclude that the practice of so obtaining these revenues constitutes an "unjust and unreasonable" discrimination in
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rates as against those living outside of the taxing municipalities.
Therefore the order of the commission is reasonable
and valid and should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
PETER M. LOWE,
Deputy Attorney General.

Attorneys for Defendant.
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